Operates hydroponic vertical farms in the United States and internationally. Produces various types of lettuce and micro-greens. Now — the numbers.
The company is still in the product-building phase: its spending runs far above its sales. That only changes once the product starts selling at scale.
Before the clock runs out, either sales must climb sharply or new money must come in. This is the most critical line in the whole picture.
This company is not turning a profit, so the market is pricing its sales instead: 0.7× for every dollar of annual revenue.
No analyst target is on record for this company.
Executives buying with their own money is usually read as confidence in the company’s future.
angles, checked one by one.
The 3 that stand out are on screen; the rest came back neutral.
The council scores out of 10; report-card grades are out of 100.
Profit per Sale: Right now the product sells for less than it costs to make; every sale deepens the loss.
An investor who bought at the very peak is down 88% today. The business is the same; what changed most is the price — and the expectations — the market pins on it.
Over the last 1 years, sales grew about 222% a year on average.
Sales run at $2.9M a year. A small number, but proof the product has real buyers.
Over the last 12 months, company executives reported 28 buys and 0 sells. Management buying with its own money is usually read as a good sign.
A loss of $40.0M against $2.9M in annual sales.
At the current pace of spending, the cash lasts less than a year. After that, the company needs to find new money.
We don’t have a report card for this stock yet — the data isn’t mature enough to grade. No grade is information too: it means the evidence is thin.
One-line summary: few numbers, an untested story. Keep watching.
Not covered, because the filings we hold do not carry it: the growth trend, earnings execution, the revenue breakdown.