Operates physical casinos and resorts across North America. Provides online sports betting platforms in multiple jurisdictions. Now — the numbers.
That much dependence is a risk in itself: if this one line weakens, the whole company feels it directly.
The company closed last year at a loss: costs ran above sales. The picture changes only if spending is reined in.
Before the clock runs out, either sales must climb sharply or new money must come in. This is the most critical line in the whole picture.
This company is not turning a profit, so the market is pricing its sales instead: 0.3× for every dollar of annual revenue.
Against companies in its own sector, it looks cheaper than 16% of them.
Analysts' average target sits 38% above today's price.
Executives buying with their own money is usually read as confidence in the company’s future.
An investor who bought at the very peak is down 78% today. The business is the same; what changed most is the price — and the expectations — the market pins on it.
The company sells $7.0B a year; the problem isn’t sales — it’s costs running above that number.
Over the last 12 months, company executives reported 31 buys and 15 sells. Management buying with its own money is usually read as a good sign.
A loss of $843.1M against $7.0B in annual sales.
At the current pace of spending, the cash lasts less than a year. After that, the company needs to find new money.
On our five-subject report card, PENN sits behind the class. A low grade doesn’t mean “doomed” — it means “big claim, small proof.”
The takeaway: PENN has solid sales but closed last year at a loss. The road back to profit runs through spending discipline.
The total grade weighs these five subjects against the sector — it isn’t a simple average of the five.
Analysts’ average target sits above today’s price, yet the valuation grade (16/100) says the stock isn’t cheap.